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A recent body of literature has claimed that differences in long-run economic 
performance within the Americas stem from the different institutional structures 
established during colonial times. This research tries to find evidence of institutional 
persistence in Colombia using direct measures of colonial institutions, particularly the 
intensity of encomiendas, slavery and State presence. The paper deals with the 
possible endogeneity of colonial institutions developing an instrumental variables 
strategy based upon colonial institutional design. We find evidence of institutional 
persistence of encomienda, slavery and State capacity on a series of current 
socioeconomic outcomes. 
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INSTITUCIONES COLONIALES Y DESEMPEÑO ECONÓMICO DE 







La literatura reciente sobre desarrollo económico e instituciones ha argumentado que 
las grandes diferencias en desempeño económico de largo plazo al interior de las 
Américas provienen de estructuras institucionales diferentes establecidas durante 
tiempos coloniales. Este estudio pretende encontrar evidencia de persistencia 
institucional en Colombia utilizando medidas directas de las instituciones coloniales, en 
particular la intensidad de la encomienda, la esclavitud y la presencia estatal. El trabajo 
enfrenta la posible endogeneidad de las instituciones coloniales desarrollando una 
estrategia de variables instrumentales basada en el diseño institucional colonial. Se 
encuentra evidencia de persistencia institucional de la encomienda, la esclavitud y la 
presencia estatal sobre una serie de resultados socioeconómicos contemporáneos. 
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…the economic, social and racial 
problems which were created by the 
conquest of the New World still exist. 
The Conquest, thus, is in the highest 
possible degree a Living past. 
 Sverker Arnoldsson 
 
1. Introduction 
  Recent contributions of economists interested in providing answers to the questions 
about economic performance in the long-run have focused on the role played by history, and 
more specifically, in the way societies have organized themselves, or have been organized by 
other societies in the past. Maybe the best example of how historical trajectories have had 
dramatic effects on long-run economic performance can be found in the histories of former 
colonies of European countries. While some of them were able to industrialize and democratize 
during the 19
th century, others were able to achieve comparable levels of per capita income and 
wellbeing only until recently. Finally, some others still exhibit dramatic levels of poverty, with 
highly unequal societies in terms of the distribution of wealth and political power. In fact, many of 
the former European colonies have had long dictatorship periods and are characterized by 
governments captured by very small ruling elites (Coatsworth, 1999). 
   Different historical paths have meant different ways of organizing economic activity and 
political structures, which in turn have produced very different levels of prosperity and economic 
development across societies. The ways in which societies organize their institutions, 
understood broadly as “… the humanly constructed restrictions that shape human interaction” 
(North, 1990), are critical for determining private as well as collective incentives towards 
entrepreneurship or rent-seeking, cooperation or opportunism, etc., because they alter relative 
prices for all of these activities. Social scientists are looking for evidence that can relate long-run 
economic performance with past institutional design for two main reasons. In the first place, 
comparative work by historians has offered documental evidence that relates differences in 
institutions to differences in historical trajectories (Lockhart and Schwartz, 1983). In the second 
place, from an econometric standpoint the relation between current institutions and current 
economic outcomes is very difficult to asses directly due to evident endogeneity problems; 
finding evidence based on past institutions may solve totally or at least partially these issues. 
It is hardly controversial that different institutional settings translate into different current 
economic outcomes, but asserting that past institutions have long-lasting effects on current 
economic performance requires the presence of what the recent literature has called institutional   3
persistence
3. This concept refers to the possibility that the effects of past institutions may persist 
over long time spans even after those specific institutions have been changed or have evolved in 
some way. This paper tries to investigate the impact of colonial institutions on current 
socioeconomic performance in Colombia, and the possible persistence they may have had since 
colonial times. To understand institutional persistence and institutional change it is necessary to 
have in mind that institutions are the product of collective decisions in societies, frequently taken 
in the political arena.  
When inefficient economic outcomes persist over time –as the low per capita income 
levels of Latin American or African countries– it must be the case that the political processes by 
which institutions are chosen and established are being subject to serious commitment problems 
–limiting the possibility of Coase-type bargains–, or take place under highly unequal distributions 
of power among the different groups in society. Moreover, given that some former European 
colonies –the so called neo-Europes– have been much more successful in the long run than 
others, it ought to be that for those countries, persistence of bad quality institutions was 
interrupted, or that past institutions differed considerably from those of unsuccessful countries. In 
case there is evidence of institutional persistence of this kind, future institutional and policy 
reform must take into account the historical specificities of each country and even of smaller 
political units if they are intended to prove successful for fighting against poverty and inequality. 
Frequently, institutional reform efforts in developing countries have failed in achieving their 
objectives possibly because of lack of attention to the particular historical backgrounds that have 
made each society’s institutions negative in specific ways for economic success.  
 
1.1. Institutional Persistence and Economic Performance 
The literature has pointed out several mechanisms that make persistence of institutions 
plausible, and that in a greater or less extent can be traced back to the Colombian case. 
Following North (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), interest groups are a 
consequence of the economic and political opportunities provided by the existing institutional 
framework, so each institutional arrangement creates interest groups whose welfare depends on 
its maintenance. Once a group –a primary action group in the sense of Davis and North (1971)– 
has made complementary investments to a set of institutions, it will be willing to incur in some 
additional costs to maintain them (Acemoglu, 1995). For the groups that do not benefit directly 
from the institutional setting –or do not benefit at all–, institutional change is a public good since 
                                                 
3 Authors like Banerjee and Iyer (2002) prefer to call it institutional overhang, stressing the negative persistent effects of some 
institutional settings, particularly for the Indian case.    4
it is non excludable and non rival. No one will be willing to incur in the entire costs of changing 
institutions –which are frequently very high– and solving collective action problems may also be 
very costly. In contrast, when ruling elites are small, the private gains of a particular set of 
extractive institutions are higher, making elites more willing to maintain them, and collective 
action problems can be overcome more easily.  
This may have been the case of Latin America, since the colonial State was administered 
by small white Spaniard elites, and post-independence States were captured by small criollo 
elites, which just replaced the colonial ones as historiography has highlighted (Lynch, 1987). The 
possibility of institutional persistence even after independence may also be due to the costliness 
of institutional change (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998, and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 
2002). If colonial institutions were already respectful of property rights, it would not pay for the 
republican elites trying to change them towards exploitative ones. In the same way, if colonial 
institutions were exploitative, elites would not find in their interest to change them, and would 
prefer to benefit from them by capturing the State.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2004) also suggest other mechanisms of institutional 
persistence through the modelling of land markets. In their model, the persistence of repressive 
institutions is the equilibrium result of a repeated game in which it may always be optimal for a 
group –the landowners– to repress workers in order to keep wages down and land prices high. 
Their model suggests that an unequal and repressive institutional setting might persist over time 
if a group in society is capable of using violence repeatedly to modify factors relative prices in 
their own benefit (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2004).  
Other recent papers
4 have shed important lights regarding why development trajectories 
in the Americas ended up being so different, with rich and relatively egalitarian North American 
countries coexisting with poor and unequal Latin American ones. There has been agreement 
around the idea that institutional design depended heavily on the initial conditions found by 
European conquerors in different regions of the American continent. 
According to this view, for which Engerman and Sokoloff’s data “does not permit rigorous 
hypothesis testing”
5, factor endowments were critical for determining the type of institutional 
design Europeans would adopt in different places, and in the long run, implied what the literature 
has called a reversal of fortune
6. Some places like the Caribbean or Brazil –well suited for 
plantation agriculture because of their climatic and environmental conditions, and risky for 
                                                 
4 See Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), Coatsworth (1978, 1993, 1999) and 
Haber (1997, 2002) among others. 
5 See Banerjee and Iyer (2002), p. 3. 
6 See for example Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) or Pritchett (1999).   5
massive European migration because of their disease environment– brought about the 
conditions for the use of slave labor because of scale economies. Other places with originally 
high population densities –usually implying complex social structures and relatively wealthy pre-
conquest societies– saw the development of coercive institutions where the colonial State, as 
well as European elites, monopolized labor, land and natural resources due to their superior 
technologies and better biological protection from contagious disease
7. Hence, places with these 
factor endowments, though very prosperous during colonial times, produced highly unequal 
societies with very small, rich, and powerful elites together with huge masses of politically 
excluded and poor populations. 
Different mechanisms of institutional persistence may have been responsible for the 
reproduction of these kinds of exploitative institutions even until present days, but on the other 
side, the same factor endowments-institutional design mechanism can explain the establishment 
of institutions conducive to economic growth. Temperate zones offered the possibility of mixed 
farming –grains agriculture along with livestock raising– based on small size land plots. These 
areas lacked densely populated indigenous societies that paid designing exploitative and 
redistributive institutions, and offered a more benign disease environment for massive European 
settlement. Colonial institutions set up in these places implied a much better distribution of 
wealth and political power, since Europeans were the majority of the population and hence, 
demanded institutions to protect their property rights, providing incentives for entrepreneurship, 
individual initiative and investment: 
… a hemispheric perspective across the range of European colonies in the New World indicates 
that although there were many influences, the factor endowment and attitudes toward it reflected in 
policy had profound and enduring impacts on the structure of respective colonial economies and 
ultimately on their long-term paths of institutional and economic development. (Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 1997, p. 36) 
  
Some papers have tried to prove Engerman and Sokoloff’s hypothesis focusing on 
different channels of institutional design and persistence. La Porta et al. (1998) find that the 
colonizer’s identity, through the different judiciary institutions they implanted, has an effect on 
current institutions across former colonies. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) also 
estimate the effect of colonial institutions on economic performance using settler mortality rates 
as an exogenous source of variation for colonial institutions in a sample of former colonies. They 
argue that colonial institutional design was closely related to the feasibility of settlement –
measured by mortality rates– and that these institutions have persisted. The authors find strong 
                                                 
7 For an account of European superiority and their capacity to conquest other societies during the 16th century see Diamond (1997).   6
evidence of institutional persistence and virtually no impact of geography on per capita income 
variability, once institutions have been accounted for.   
 
1.2. Fundamental vs. Proximate Causes 
Institutions have been only one of the plausible fundamental causes of economic 
performance considered by social scientists. In very broad terms, geography and culture have 
been the other landmarks considered as possible fundamental causes of economic development 
or backwardness. For example Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs 
(1998) find a relation between climatic and soil conditions and economic outcomes for a group of 
countries, and for Colombia, Núñez and Sánchez (2000) study the impact of geographical 
variables on a constructed measure of municipal per capita GDP. Some other studies, for which 
empirical research has been very scarce, try to asses the impact of cultural differences on 
economic performance
8. Barro and McLeary (2003), as well as Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2003) focus on religious differences, while Putnam (1993) studies differences in civic 
characteristics across Italy.   
  Geography is highly variable within Colombia. At the same time, cultural specificities may 
also be important given that ethnic groups –indians and afro-descendents with documented 
differences in their social organization– currently inhabit different regions of the country. Given 
the importance of geographical as well as cultural theories of development, this paper aims to 
test the relative importance –compared to institutions– of these hypotheses for the Colombian 
case.  
For this reason the paper focuses on the impact of deep determinants rather than 
proximate causes –such as investment or public expenditure– on economic outcomes. The more 
traditional literature on economic growth has focused precisely on these so called proximate 
causes of development, looking at human and physical capital accumulation, saving rates, 
investment or technological adaptation, etc. Important contributions have been made, such as 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Barro (1996) or Quah (1996), which prove the strong impacts 
of such variables on growth. However, even after taking into account any endogeneity concerns, 
they leave unanswered the most fundamental questions about why some societies decide to 
invest, innovate or accumulate more capital than others. This strategy may allow an assessment 
                                                 
8 The difference between culture and institutions is frequently vague. For this paper’s purpose, and following North (1981), culture 
can be interpreted as informal institutions, meaning any kind of implicit rules of social interaction, usually very specific to each 
society.     7
of the capacity of some specific fundamental causes to explain current performance variability, 
avoiding the troubles implied by endogeneity issues when studying proximate causes. 
 
1.3. The Within-Country Approach 
Factor endowments vary considerably across the Americas, but it is also well known that 
geographical conditions and natural resource endowments vary across Colombia
9. In somewhat 
more than one million square kilometers there are coastal areas –both in the Caribbean and in 
the Pacific Ocean– savannas, mountain ranges –the Andes–, interandean valleys and tropical 
rainforests, with climates ranging form the extremely hot to the very cold, and some areas 
suitable for agriculture as well as others better suited for livestock raising or mining activities. 
This observation alone could be enough motivation for looking at Engerman and Sokoloff’s 
factor endowments-institutional persistence hypothesis for the Colombian case. 
Even more, a closer look to Colombian colonial history also reveals important within-
country variability in the kind of institutions set up by Europeans. In particular, labor institutions 
were organized differently according to environmental and pre-Hispanic demographic conditions, 
and colonial State presence varied considerably depending on the incentives faced by the 
Crown
10. Central economic regions coexisted with frontier areas –actually, some of them were 
never reached by Europeans or by European descent until the 19
th century–. Given that the 
former institutional theory of comparative development applies to a cross-country level, it is quite 
plausible that it may also work at a within-country one. But even more suggestive is the fact that 
current within-Colombia economic performance presents huge variation too. Per capita GDP of 
the richest department was more than nine fold that of the poorest in 2002
11, and while there are 
prosperous urban areas where industry and services represent a large proportion of added 
value, others remain backward, with low life expectancy rates, high Unmet Basic Needs indexes 
and virtually no public goods provision. Table 1 compares per capita GDP and other current 
measures of welfare for Colombian departments
12. 
Within-country variability for testing institutional persistence has been exploited for other 
countries, though the literature is scarce. Mitchner and McLean (2003) study labor productivity 
variability within the United States and find that intensity of slavery during the 19
th century 
explains a high proportion of current productivity level variability between states, even when 
                                                 
9 Actually this is true not only for Colombia but for many other Latin American countries. See Acemoglu, Bautista and Robinson 
(2005). 
10 Coatsworth (2004) studies economic organization during colonial times in Latin America. 
11 DANE National Accounts (2005), at www.dane.gov.co. 
12 Colombia is politically organized as a centralized republic divided into 32 departments and the capital city, Bogotá.     8
considering the possible endogeneity of slavery.  They Follow Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2002), who argue that slaves were taken in higher proportions to those places where settlement 
was less attractive for Europeans because of higher mortality rates. Using soldier mortality as an 
instrument for slavery, Mitchner and McLean find a causal effect of this exploitative institution on 
current productivity.  
Banerjee and Iyer (2002) also study the effect of colonial land tenure systems on current 
economic performance in India. They exploit the fact that some Indian regions faced different 
land tax structures in colonial times. While in some of them taxes were raised directly by British 
officials over individual cultivators, in others, local landlords had the right to tax peasants under a 
contract with the British crown. Finally, in some other regions villagers commonly owned land 
and raised taxes directly. Banerjee and Iyer find that differences in colonial land tax institutions 
are related to huge differences in current economic performance. These authors also deal with 
the possible endogeneity of land tenure institutions, modeling the land tax design process. They 
argue that decisions over different types of land tenure systems were grounded on changing 
ideologies based on the most recent economic doctrines. Given that the British conquest took 
several decades, conquest dates serve as an instrument for assessing the effect of land tenure 
systems over current economic outcomes such as agricultural investment, productivity and 
public goods provision. They find that landlord based land tenure systems have a strong 
negative effect over these outcome variables. These few studies provide appealing evidence 
that institutional persistence may be a strong force driving economic performance within very 
different countries. 
The aim of this paper is to exploit within-Colombia variability in current outcomes as well 
as in colonial institutions, to test whether it is possible to find institutional persistence from 
colonial times up to the present through the channels Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) have 
stressed. Despite the plausibility of this kind of institutional persistence in the Colombian case, 
where factor endowments determined institutional design at the local level, the particular history 
of  Nueva Granada
13 suggests that those channels may have been more complex than we 
should expect based on their theory.  
Engerman and Sokoloff’s account is probably too simple to describe the Colombian case. 
Indeed, in Colombia not only the appearance of exploitative institutions such as encomienda or 
slavery depended upon factor endowments; at the same time, the presence of the colonial State 
                                                 
13 Nueva Granada was the name given by Spaniards during colonial times to the Audience and later to the Viceroyalty of what is 
more or less currently Colombia. The territory of the Audience limited to the south with the Province of Quito and the Viceroyalty of 
Peru, and included current Panama and some western regions of current Venezuela.       9
–and hence the institutions accompanying it– was also closely related to factor endowments, 
and in particular, to the ease of fiscal income raising based on taxation of economic activities
14. 
Along with the fact that State presence meant coercive redistribution and hierarchical political 
structures, it also provided some public goods such as roads or a judiciary –that could even look 
behind the interests of indigenous people as some historians have shown repeatedly
15–, and 
could operate as part of a checks and balances mechanism limiting the opportunism of local 
elites and priests.  
I give some explanations to these issues by studying the most important colonial 
institutions –according to historiography– for the economic and political organization of colonial 
Nueva Granada, along with the impact they have had on current economic performance 
indicators at a municipality level
16. While historians have offered a huge amount of compelling 
evidence supporting institutional persistence, causality –from past institutions onto current 
outcomes– still remains to be proven or rejected.  
Specifically, the questions that this paper tries to answer follow closely those in 
Acemoglu, Bautista and Robinson (2005), where the authors ask if there is statistical evidence 
that colonial institutions actually influence contemporary outcomes, and what mechanisms may 
be relating both. Studying a specific set of institutions allows a focus on very specific channels of 
institutional change, making easier the identification of mechanisms. Since colonial institutions 
are no longer operating, they are potentially very good candidates to be truly exogenous 
variables, so any evidence of a causal relationship may be interpreted as institutional 
persistence. After understanding in detail the colonial institutional design, this will enable me to 
construct an instrumental variables strategy for handling any possible endogeneity issues. As 
Acemoglu, Bautista and Robinson (2005) point out, having a variable from hundreds of years 
ago does not immediately avoid endogeneity concerns, since it may be correlated with hard to 
measure omitted variables. If causes persist, past variables may not be exogenous to current 
outcomes.
17  
A major advantage of this paper is the possibility of focusing on a within-country analysis, 
in which a set of important determinants of economic development frequently included in cross-
country studies remain constant across units of observation. This solves the problem of 
                                                 
14 The case of the Province of Popayán is very revealing. Even though gold mines were located in the Chocó region –one with 
resisting indigenous tribes and a difficult disease environment– the caja real as well as the mining businesses were administered 
from the city of Popayán, hundreds of kilometers away. 
15 Bonnett (2002) gives evidence on how the colonial judicial system in many cases looked behind the interests of indigenous 
populations in the face of Spanish abuse. 
16 The most immediate indicator of economic performance is per capita GDP but unfortunately, no measures of this variable exist at 
a municipality level.  
17 This point is also stressed by Banerjee and Iyer (2002).   10
controlling for highly unobservable variation in country-specific factors that may influence 
colonial institutions and current economic outcomes at the same time. Characteristics such as 
language, culture or technology vary enormously across countries, and in many cases 
institutions are not clearly comparable between nations. In the Colombian case, some of these 
characteristics can confidently be considered homogeneous between regions, so this major 
caveat of cross-country studies is not an issue here. 
Finally, an institutional persistence account would, if successful, be at the same time part 
of an answer to the questions about the huge disparities between levels of economic 
development between Colombian regions. The latter question has never been answered from an 
institutional perspective
18. A direct measurement of the colonial legacy has never been done for 
Colombia, and many questions regarding economic disparities between regions have not been 
tackled yet. If any relationship arises between colonial institutions and current outcomes, the 
contribution of this paper would be bold from a theoretical standpoint, and surprising given the 
nature of the data and the time span separating us from colonial times. 
  
  1.4. Overview 
In this paper I construct three direct measures of colonial institutions intensity at the 
municipality level: the number of tribute paying indians in encomiendas in 1560, the proportion of 
slaves in 1843 and the presence of the colonial State in 1794. I regress current economic 
outcomes of importance for human welfare on the colonial institutional measures, controlling for 
several other variables that may be important for determining economic performance. The 
measures of colonial institutional intensity were taken from original documents where data on 
tributary population, slavery and State presence were recorded in a detailed way at a 
disaggregated level.  
In fact, the estimated effects are robust and significant for some of the outcome variables 
I consider. This is surprising given that encomienda, slavery and colonial administration no 
longer exist, and that the colonial institutions variables are inevitably subject to considerable 
measurement error. Each one of the institutions considered has an important effect over at least 
one of the current economic performance variables considered. Slavery appears to be strongly 
related with current land inequality, while State presence is robustly associated with better public 
goods provision measured by primary and secondary enrollment as well as by infant mortality 
rates. Interestingly, State presence appears to have no effect on land distribution. The presence 
                                                 
18 Meisel (2001) and Nuñez and Sanchez (2000) study within-Colombian economic development, growth and convergence focusing 
mainly on geography and infrastructure, but center their analysis on the 20
th century.   11
of tributary indians or encomiendas is associated with worse land distribution, higher mortality 
rates and lower primary and secondary enrolment rates. A sensibility analysis is carried out to 
control for other important fundamental causes of long-run economic performance, such as 
geography and culture. An instrumental variables strategy is also implemented to tackle the 
possible endogeneity of the tributary indians and slavery variables due to omitted and 
unobservable factors which may be correlated with them and may be causing current economic 
outcomes. Based on historical evidence, this paper argues that altitude above sea level is an 
accurate exogenous source of variation for tributary indian population and encomienda, and that 
the presence of a gold mine at any moment during the colonial period is also a good predictor of 
the intensity of slavery, both being orthogonal to current economic performance. Instrumental 
variables results appear to be more significant than OLS in several cases. OLS coefficients for 
some regressions produce signs opposite to those expected by the theory, but the signs change 
under the IV strategy. This suggests that OLS estimates may be biased due to measurement 
error. 
  Section 2 of this paper studies the historical background of colonial institutions in Nueva 
Granada, trying to understand the process of institutional design. Section 3 describes the nature 
of the data in detail, section 4 explains the empirical methodology along with the instrumental 
variables strategy and section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes, trying to grasp 
some of the potential mechanisms of institutional persistence suggested by the results.   
 
2. Historical Background  
  The arrival of Europeans to America in the late 15
th and early 16
th centuries can be 
considered a critical juncture, since it implied a dramatic, deep and sudden change in the social 
organization of pre-Hispanic societies and in the continent’s landscape. In the social sciences it 
is frequently very difficult to find causal relationships between variables because of the evident 
endogeneity of social phenomena. Hence, from a scientific point of view, the conquest and 
colonization of the Americas can be seen as a truly exogenous shock and as such, can be 
studied as a natural experiment. 
 
2.1. Colonial Nueva Granada 
Spaniards arrived to present-day Colombia in the early 16
th century, initially through the 
Caribbean coast. Historians have shown that early conquistadores did not have a clear interest 
for settlement on this region. They preferred to undertake indian capture campaigns to use them   12
as slaves and carry out the so called cabalgadas, in which, with the use of horses, entire 
indigenous communities were devastated with the purpose of appropriating their food and 
precious objects (Luna, 1993). Cities founded along the Caribbean Coast answered to the need 
of military forts which could be used as advance posts for military expeditions, and as ports for 
provision from the Caribbean islands.  
Only after some time a few urban centers started growing around the more complex 
indigenous communities, where the encomienda acquired some importance. The effect of 
military expansionist policies, combined with tropical climatic conditions favorable to epidemics, 
meant a dramatic demographic fall of indigenous people. Consequently, Spaniards started 
replacing the falling indigenous labor force with slave population from the African west coasts 
starting in the late 16
th century. In this way, Cartagena became the most important slave trade 
port of South America and remained as such during all the 17
th century. As a result, the 
Caribbean was characterized by a weak presence of encomienda, a strong presence of 
plantation and mining slavery, and a heavily concentrated presence of the Colonial State in a 
few important ports as Figures 1 to 4 suggest. 
Some years after the Spanish settlement on the Caribbean Coast, conquistadores 
started exploring deeper south into the territory, following mainly the upstream course of the 
Magdalena River, attracted by the discovery of the Inca Empire in the 1520s. In this way, 
Spaniards made contact with Andean indigenous communities, and in particular, with the 
politically and socially complex chibchas who inhabited the eastern highlands, in current central 
Colombia. The much higher population densities found all along the Andes, together with a 
better disease environment because of lower temperatures, translated into Spanish urban 
settlements and a strong presence of encomienda, even after the demographic collapse of 
indigenous populations.  
The first geographic guides give a fair idea of the reasons motivating the foundation of a city in a 
specific place… The cardinal criterion for choosing an ideal location was the availability, docility and 
abundance of indigenous labor force. If healthy climate and soil fertility were added, conditions 
would be ideal
19 (Palacios and Safford, 2002, p.76) 
 
Agriculture became the main economic activity, characterized by non-increasing returns 
native crops such as corn or potatoes and European cereals such as wheat. The absence of 
scale economies in agriculture, together with the absence of important mines, meant that 
Spaniards could only benefit from direct labor force exploitation. Control of indigenous labor 
force required surveillance, reorganization and relocations, for which stronger administrative and 
                                                 
19 Translated by the author from the Spanish Edition.   13
religious presence was required. In this sense, economic activity around agriculture based on 
coerced labor force was accompanied by larger urban centers and a stronger State presence. At 
the same time, the local State –many times captured by local encomendero elites– was directed 
towards the benefit of Spanish interests, and the Crown –given it fiscal needs– tried to limit 
encomendero and even church exploitation of indians. The conflict between local elites and 
State officials has been widely documented, and the correlation of forces varied with time. 
Soon after conquest, the crown intended to subject conquistadores to its control. Nevertheless, for 
decades the action of its emissaries seemed to have been as important to spread disorder as to 
establish royal authority…Weakening official power, these conflicts helped perpetuate the 
charismatic authority of conquistadores. Many Spanish officials who tried to protect indigenous 
populations by applying legislation frequently became targets of attacks by other officials allied with 
encomenderos
20 (Palacios and Safford, 2002, p.84) 
 
Other authors also argue that the colonial State tried to limit the church’s actions, since 
priests were not only the recipients of part of indian tribute –mainly tithe
21– but also had authority 
over indians through evangelization
22. These traits persisted more or less unchanged along the 
three centuries of colonial administration. 
Conquest and colonization of the southern regions of actual Colombia came from Peru 
since some of the participants of the Inca Empire’s conquest were allowed to conquer north. The 
central and western ranges of the Andes were settled by these Spaniards, who followed the 
Cauca and Magdalena Rivers downstream. This colonization path established a third important 
region characterized by the presence of gold mines scattered throughout mountain slopes and 
rivers. Indigenous tribes in those areas differed considerably among each other in terms of their 
political and social organization. Indians of the highlands of the current departments of Nariño 
and Cauca –such as the Pastos or Quillacingas– had attained some relatively complex levels of 
social organization, while the valleys of the Cauca and Magdalena rivers were inhabited by 
nomadic and more egalitarian societies.  
Spaniards had a hard time trying to defeat the more bellicose tribes, but after some time 
they were able to almost annihilate them. The resistance of some indigenous tribes is best 
exemplified by the Cunas and Emberas of the Chocó region. Only after 1680 were Spaniards 
able to settle in the area because of the violent resistance of these tribes. As a result institutional 
design in the western region of actual Colombia was highly variable. In some places, such as the 
southern Andean highlands, the encomienda was the basis of economic organization, while 
other regions soon developed mining activities based on slave population, as in actual northern 
                                                 
20 Translated by the author from the Spanish Edition. 
21 Tithe was a direct tax on agricultural produce, usually of 10% over aggregate production, which accrued to the church. 
22 See, for example, Bonnett (2002).   14
Caldas or later, along the rivers of Chocó. The appearance of African slaves in mining activities 
followed the sharp decline of indian population, originally forced to work in the mines. Mining 
was also accompanied by village foundation, though these settlements frequently disappeared 
soon after mines were exhausted. Since mining activities were at the heart of economic interests 
of the Crown and the Spaniards, the agricultural activities based on indigenous labor were 
intended to supply mines with food and materials. Finally, other regions remained as frontiers for 
long periods, with a virtual absence of the Colonial State (See figures 1 to 4).  
   
2.2. Colonial Labor Institutions 
The previous section allowed us to grasp the general process of institutional design 
following the Spanish conquest of Nueva Granada, focusing on labor institutions and State 
presence. The present subsection studies each one of these colonial institutions in more detail 
pointing towards the instrumental variables strategy that will be used subsequently.  
The  encomienda consisted of a right to indigenous labor and tribute, granted by the 
crown to Spanish conquerors or other settlers. According to Coatsworth (2004) and Yaeger 
(1995), this institution provided a set of conflicting incentives to encomenderos as well as to 
indians and crown officials: 
An encomienda was an organization in which a Spaniard received a restricted set of property rights 
over indian labor from the crown whereby the Spaniard (an encomendero) could extract tribute 
(payment of a portion of output) from the indians in the form of goods, metals, money, or direct 
labor services. In exchange, encomenderos provided the indians protection and instruction in the 
Catholic faith, promised to defend the area and paid a tax to the crown. (Yaeger, 1995, p. 843) 
  
But the set of property rights was restricted in several ways, since the Spaniards didn’t 
own the indians or the lands where they inhabited, and inheritance of the right was restricted. At 
the same time, indigenous populations were falling sharply, due mainly to inevitable epidemics, 
so encomenderos found attractive to overexploit indians –since the stock of labor assigned to 
them would not last for a very long time–. Though the encomienda was costly for the crown as it 
meant less tribute, the huge costs implied by the direct control of indigenous populations made 
the partial privatization of labor a feasible and attractive strategy.  
Under the encomienda regime Indigenous populations were highly restricted in terms of 
their mobility, and coercive practices were common to avoid shirking. They were excluded from 
political participation and from access to capital and credit markets, and the institutional setting 
was designed so as to drive wages to subsistence levels. The need of a surplus out from indian 
labor that could be redistributed towards the encomendero, the church, and the crown, meant 
that only tribes with the capability of producing these surpluses –given their pre-conquest social   15
organization, sedentarism and ecological conditions of the lands they inhabited– were attractive 
to Spaniards. Hence, as mentioned before, the encomienda appeared mainly in regions 
inhabited by the politically and socially more developed indigenous tribes. Nomadic groups 
would be very costly to organize in encomiendas, and being much smaller in numbers, they 
were also much more vulnerable to European epidemics. In this case, it was less costly for 
Spaniards to replace physically indigenous populations with slave labor imported from Africa.  
In the Colombian case, pre-Hispanic indigenous populations varied considerably in their 
level of political development. “…the anthropological framework explains the historical fact of 
Spanish settlement. Conquerors tried to establish where the indigenous social relations 
hierarchies could be replaced at low cost, and where there already existed a leading caste” 
(Colmenares, 1999, p. 31).
23 
The more highly organized indigenous groups were found in highlands such as the 
Altiplano Cundiboyacense or the Pasto and Popayán plateaus, while nomadic tribes inhabited 
the interandean valleys and the coasts. In fact, there is a very strong and positive relation 
between altitude and indigenous population densities. Service (1966) develops a taxonomy of 
pre-Hispanic indian tribes according to their degree of social complexity. In his classification, 
altitude plays a central role, since highland indians were able to produce agricultural surpluses. 
Indians inhabiting mountain slopes and inter-Andean valleys had less developed agricultural 
techniques. Finally, other highly mobile marginal tribes inhabiting the lowlands based their 
subsistence in hunting and gathering activities. Palacios and Safford (2002) agree with this view:  
At least since the conquest times and, based on what is known, also during the pre-Columbian 
times, the highest human densities were found in the highlands that allowed escaping high 
temperature climates and tropical diseases, and offered favorable conditions for agriculture
24. 
(Palacios and Safford, 2002, p. 16)  
 
Slavery was another fundamental labor institution in Latin America and in Nueva 
Granada. Starting in the mid 16
th century, Europeans forced the migration of millions of Africans 
to America –especially to the Caribbean and the Pacific Coast– in order to replace rapidly 
declining indigenous populations. According to Coatsworth (2004), the rise of African based 
slavery was critically related to several very particular conditions of some American regions. On 
one side, geography, climate and soil characteristics determined suitable areas for slave-based 
plantation agriculture and for mining activities, and by the other, colonial State policies 
determined the destination of slaves. 
                                                 
23 Translated by the author from the Spanish Edition. 
24 Translated by the author from the Spanish Edition.   16
Europeans took slaves mainly to lowland tropical regions, which for the Nueva Granada 
case frequently coincided with gold mining areas. Although the literature has stressed a relation 
between plantation economies and slavery in the Americas (Coatsworth, 2004 and Engerman 
and Sokoloff, 1997), slavery in Nueva Granada followed more closely the distribution of gold 
mines. In fact, gold was the main export commodity during all the colonial period, and Nueva 
Granada was the biggest individual gold exporter to Spain (Sharp, 1976 and Colmenares, 1999). 
Nowadays, colonial mining regions such as the Chocó or the Cauca valley have the highest 
proportions of afro-descendent populations in the country. These regions were characterized by 
high levels of inequality, very powerful elites and, according to Coatsworth (2004), were among 
the last in Latin America to call into question the colonial institutional order.  
 
  2.3. The Colonial State 
  The Spanish conquest of America was mainly a private enterprise. During the first years 
the Crown limited its intervention to the granting of conquest rights for private agents and to the 
establishment of legislation –for which enforcement could be very weak–. Financing the 
conquest was responsibility of conquistadores (Zavala, 1940 and Lockhart and Schwartz, 1983). 
Even the granting of the first encomiendas was undertaken by the leaders of the expeditions, 
and only after some time did the Spanish officials start to administer the encomienda grants 
directly. In the first stage, the Crown mediated the conflicting interests between conquistadores, 
and regulated the foundation of cities. With time, the settlement of Spaniards in urban centers, 
along with the need for a regulation of economic activities based on indian labor, created a 
demand for State presence. In this sense, State capacity appears to be highly correlated with 
indian population densities and urban Spanish settlements, which, as pointed out before, also 
appeared hand in hand. The coexistence of encomienda and State presence many times meant 
that  encomendero elites managed to capture State organizations such as the cabildos –city 
councils–, using them to their own benefit, for example, to grant the best located or better quality 
lands for themselves. Calero (1997) stresses this point in the case of the city of Pasto:  
Land appropriation was closely intertwined with the structures of political power. This power 
rested in the local cabildo, an institution established for the town’s governance, but whose 
influence reached far beyond the town itself. Such matters as encomienda inheritance, 
assignment of town plots, formal validation of new residents (vecinos), celebration of feasts, 
appointment of town officials, and allotment of estancia land were all functions performed by the 
cabildo… During the first decades of European occupation, when encomienda holders and 
estancieros were buying their highest returns, the cabildo was a group mostly made up of 
encomenderos who constituted a powerful economic and political elite… Cabildo records for the 
years 1564-1569 indicate that out of thirty-nine land concessions, twenty-five went to individuals 
who held both encomienda trusts and cabildo membership. Eight others went to cabildo 
members who had no allocation of indians in encomienda, and only five grantees had no 
connection with either encomiendas or the town’s government. These figures indicate beyond   17
any doubt that land-grant allocation favored the early encomendero elite and their descendants, 
who already controlled decisions in the district of Pasto. (Calero, 1997, pp. 104-105)      
 
The case of Pasto may well have repeated itself in varying degrees in other important 
colonial urban centers of Nueva Granada, depending on the relative power of local elites vis-à-
vis the Spanish Crown officials. In fact, the case of Pasto could be considered an extreme case 
of Crown’s weakness, since the southern region of Nueva Granada was for a long time a 
peripheral area. The search for evidence of institutional persistence tries, precisely, to uncover 
the possible continuation of these historical traits of land inequality and concentration of political 
power, that may have translated into differing paths of economic performance in the long-run.  
 
3. The Data 
To test the hypothesis that the extent of colonial institutions has an effect on current 
economic performance, I constructed direct measures of the intensity of those colonial 
institutions highlighted in the literature as the most important for social organization during the 
colonial period in Nueva Granada. I also gathered information on current socioeconomic 
outcomes of interest. Municipality level data was chosen since this is the smallest possible unit 
of observation –thus enlarging the sample size– and it allows capturing more variability, given 
that even within each department differences in current economic performance are considerable 
(See Table 1). 
 There is a large amount of documentation about indigenous population during colonial 
times –including transcripts by historians from original documents–. For our purposes, the 1560 
anonymous visit copied by Tovar (1988)
25 was selected as the main source of information on 
indigenous population because of its comprehensiveness and its early date
26. Only after 1560 
did Spaniards start gathering the scattered indian tribes in pueblos de indios, so the distribution 
of indians at this date can be confidently considered quite close to the geographic pattern of pre-
conquest indian location (Herrera, 1999 and González, 1992). 
The document reports the number of tributary indians assigned to each encomienda, 
specifying the province to which the encomienda corresponded. A very meticulous job was done 
to match each one of the 1560 encomiendas to current municipalities, based mainly on historical 
cartography and anthropological works on toponimics for all the country. More than 82% of the 
                                                 
25 López de Velasco’s (1574) account of Nueva Granada’s population was based directly on this visit. 
26 A visit consisted of a census of Indian population for tributary purpose. The visitor traveled all around the area under scrutiny, 
counting Indians in every encomienda. The 1560 visit is the first one known for the Nueva Granada, and is the only one that covers 
almost all of the current Colombian territory. Many other visits took place during the 16
th and 17
th centuries, but the 1560 one is the 
most comprehensive and was done at an early date, so the relocation and demographic fall of indigenous populations are not 
important issues.   18
indian population reported in the visit was successfully matched
27. Though these documents 
usually reported tributary indians only –males between 17 and 50 years of age who, by law, 
should pay tribute–, historians have found a 1 to 3 relation between tributary and total population 
(Meisel, 1980 and Tovar, 1970). Our dataset contains information for 21 current departments, 
mainly those located in the Andean region, and around the principal Caribbean Coast port cities 
(See Figure 1). A dummy variable taking the value of one for any municipality who had 
successfully been matched to one or more 1560 encomiendas was created, with the purpose of 
carrying out a robustness check on the basic results, given the possibility of measurement error 
in the number of tributary indians variable. It is important to highlight that if a municipality is 
coded as having no tributary indians, this does not necessarily imply that no indians lived in that 
place. It means that by 1560 no indians in that location had been assigned into encomiendas. A 
detailed description of the construction of this variable can be found in Appendix 1. 
 As the basic labor institution under which mining and plantation agriculture developed in 
Nueva Granada during colonial times, slavery data was also coded based on a national census 
done in 1843. By this time the country had already achieved its independence from Spain, and 
the “wombs law” had been approved
28. As a consequence, slave population fell considerably 
compared to the late colonial period, but the falling rates can be confidently supposed to have 
been homogeneous across municipalities, so variability between them may have remained 
constant. In fact, the correlation of slave population at a province level between the 1778 and the 
1843 censuses is of almost 80%
29.  
The slavery intensity measure consists on the proportion of slave population in each 
municipality. It was possible to build this measure since the 1843 census provides information on 
both total and slave population. For several municipalities it was necessary to match 1843 
names to current municipality names too, due to the fact that from then onward new 
municipalities were founded, which where then small villages usually with changing names. 
Figure 2 shows a Slavery intensity map and Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all of the 
colonial institutions measures at a departmental level. Though the average proportion of slaves 
is very small –0.8% for all the country–, it has an ample variation among the 23 departments for 
which slaves were reported. 
                                                 
27 Out of the 197,886 tributary Indians reported in the 1560 visit, it was not possible to assign the 35,576 indians of 353 encomiendas 
to any current municipality. It was not possible to find any reference of the names of these encomiendas that could let us locate them 
in any current municipality. 
28 The 1821 Ley de Vientres was approved by the Cúcuta Congress as a first step towards total slave manumission. It intended to be 
a transition mechanism to avoid a direct conflict with slave owners. From that date onward all the children of slave women would be 
free after becoming 18.   
29 The 1778 census reports population aggregated at a provincial level. For this reason it could not be used as a source for 
econometric estimations.   19
The third institution of interest –the colonial State presence– was measured in alternative 
ways, based on Duran y Diaz (1794). His work –inscribed in the bourbon administrative reforms 
aimed at achieving a greater control over the American colonies– gives a full account of State 
officials, salaries, the military, tariffs, taxes and fiscal revenue among others for all of the 
Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada. The document specifies the location of officials and State 
administrations. Of particular interest, Duran y Diaz (1794) has a complete record of every 
estanco, alcabala, and mail service office at a current municipality level –towns, villages or cities 
then–. An estanco was a State monopoly over the sale of a particular good, many times 
including also a monopsony by which the State regulated quantities and production rights. In 
particular, Duran y Díaz reports the presence of two different estancos; one for tobacco and 
playing cards and another one for aguardiente (a liquor) and gunpowder. An alcabala was a tax 
over sales –usually 2% over the sale price–, and mail service was also a State monopoly. 
Based on these four alternative measures of State presence, I built an index taking 
values from 0 to 4 depending on the number of 1794 institutions in each current municipality. If a 
given municipality has a tobacco estanco, an aguardiente estanco, mail service and an alcabala, 
it is coded with a 4
30. Although at first glance it appears that these colonial State institutions may 
have been a burden for private enterprise, they also suggest a bigger supply of public goods at 
the local level. Moreover, given the previous discussion about potential conflict between local 
elites and the Crown, it is possible that this measure of State presence captures the capability of 
the State for limiting political power inequality. This index will be my preferred measure of State 
presence intensity, though the number of Crown employees and each one of the institutions 
were used independently as alternative measures. Crown employees are a direct and intuitive 
way of measuring the presence of the State, but they were heavily concentrated in the most 
important urban centers, reducing variability. From a total of 5,810 officials registered by Duran y 
Díaz, 3,844 were in Cartagena –a first order military center on the Caribbean– and 715 were in 
Bogotá –the Viceroyalty capital–. 
Geographical variables were also included in the analysis, in particular latitude, longitude, 
mean annual rainfall and altitude above sea level. The density of first, second, and third level 
rivers in each municipality was also included (extension of rivers in meters divided by 
municipality surface area in square kilometers). Since transport costs have been pointed out by 
historians as important determinants of economic performance during colonial times, I also 
coded a dummy variable for municipalities whose urban area is a port over the Magdalena River, 
                                                 
30 The construction of this index implies the plausible assumption of a linear relationship between the level of State presence and the 
outcome variables of interest. It also assumes that the individual effect of any of the State institutions is quantitatively the same.    20
the main communication artery during colonial times. Distance from each municipality to the 
capital city of its department was also coded to control for the possible effects of a nearby 
political center or an important market. 
Finally I also included the earliest foundation date of each municipality based on Bernand 
and Zambrano (1993). This variable seems to be important since during the second half of the 
18
th century and the second half of the 19
th century a process of town foundations took place. 
The former was product of the resguardos dissolution policy by which indian reservoirs were 
auctioned and turned into parroquias –towns of mestizos and poor whites– and the latter 
because of the colonization of peripheral areas for coffee cultivation (Bonnett, 2002 and 
LeGrand, 1986). Institutions and unobservable characteristics of these municipalities may differ 
from older ones, and historians have suggested they may have better than average income and 
wealth distributions and better economic performance. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
The empirical strategy aims to relate a set of current outcome variables at the 
municipality level with different measures of colonial institutions intensity. That this strategy may 
be promising is suggested by Figures 5, 6 and 7, which plot the average departmental intensity 
of slavery, encomienda, and State presence against current GDP per capita. They show a 
negative relationship for slavery, and a positive relation for State presence, at least at the 
departmental level. For encomienda, the linear fit is positive but only due to Boyacá and 
Cundinamarca which are clearly outliers. These two departments were inhabited by large 
indigenous populations during colonial times, which made them the political center of Nueva 
Granada. Unfortunately there is no measure of per capita GDP at the municipality level, so with 
Occam’s razor in mind, some of the socioeconomic outcomes more clearly related to welfare 
and development are used. Specifically, this research looks at land distribution measured by the 
Gini Coefficient and calculated by Offstein, Caballero and Hillón (2003), primary and secondary 
gross enrolment rates, infant mortality rates of children less than 1 year and the Unmet Basic 
Needs Index (NBI), a frequently used measure of structural poverty. Table 3 shows descriptive 
statistics of these variables at the departmental level.     
 
4.1. Methodology 
Accordingly, I will estimate the following linear regression by Ordinary Least Squares:  
       i i i i i ate ColonialSt Slavery Encomienda y ε β β β β + + + + + = i 4X β 3 2 1 0      (1)   21
where yi is the outcome variable of interest, Encomiendai is one of the possible measures of 
encomienda intensity in 1560, Slaveryi is the proportion of slaves on total population in 1843, 
ColonialStatei is one of the possible measures of State presence in 1794, Xi is a vector with 
geographic and other control variables, and i indexes municipalities.  β 1,  β 2 and  β 3 are the 
coefficients of interest. ε i is the error term, assumed to have zero mean. The initial identification 
assumption on this specification is that the institutions intensity variables are uncorrelated with 
the error term, that is, that any omitted variables in the regression are not correlated with 
encomienda, slavery or State Presence. If this assumption were true, OLS would consistently 
estimate the effect of colonial institutions on the variability of current socioeconomic performance 
between municipalities. Although this assumption is very strong given our previous discussion 
about colonial institutional design, it is worth estimating the model as a benchmark. The 
exogeneity of encomienda may be a very strong assumption, while it may be more reasonable 
for slavery, given that it was closely related to gold mines, whose distribution, given by nature, 
can confidently be considered random. However, these assumptions will be relaxed later. 
Regarding colonial State presence, the exogeneity assumption also looks very strong, but for 
lack of an appropriate IV strategy, I will maintain it along the whole document taking care of not 
making a strong interpretation of results on it. 
To deal with the possibility of omitted variables causing endogeneity –and hence 
inconsistency of the OLS estimation– an instrumental variables strategy will be implemented. 
Since it is very difficult to control appropriately for every possible element that may be causing 
current economic performance, if one or some of these omitted variables appears to be 
correlated with my measures of colonial institutions, the standard OLS assumption of no 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term will be violated, producing 
inconsistent estimates for all the coefficients in regression (1). It is possible that encomienda 
intensity may be correlated with variables such as land quality, since pre-Hispanic indigenous 
tribes could have been settled on better soils, or because Spaniards gathered them in places 
with a particular set of characteristics. In any case, it is clear that indigenous population 
distribution was not random in 1560. In the case of slavery, as pointed out above, gold mines, as 
innate characteristics of geography, may be considered random, and thus the distribution of the 
majority of slaves. Nevertheless, slaves were also taken to urban centers for domestic work and 
were used as labor force in cotton and sugarcane plantations (Colmenares, 1999). To be sure 
that the impact of slavery is not biased under OLS estimation, I will also instrument this variable 
using a dichotomous measure of gold mine presence. Regarding State presence, it is also clear   22
that colonial State distribution was not at all random. Unfortunately, dealing with the possible 
endogeneity of this institution may require an entirely different paper, so here the colonial state 
presence will only be used as a control variable and I will not press hard on results about it. 
Tackling the endogeneity problem requires a close look at the previous discussion about 
institutional design during the colonial period, since I need an exogenous source of variation –
the instrument– correlated with each one of the possibly endogenous variables but not 
correlated with the error term of the structural equation (1). Theoretically, this means that the 
instruments, though able to explain the behavior of encomienda and slavery distribution, should 
not be structural determinants of socioeconomic performance today. 
By 1560 Spaniards were only starting to gather indians into pueblos de indios, but 
encomiendas had been granted over indigenous populations scattered around the territory. As 
explained earlier, the distribution of pre-Hispanic indian population was strongly associated with 
altitude above sea level. Microverticality
31 and disease environment conditions may explain this 
pattern. Since there is no reason to suppose that altitude above sea level by itself may directly 
cause current socioeconomic outcomes once geography has been accounted for, this variable 
will be the instrument for tributary indian population in 1560. Figure 8 plots the number of 
tributary indians against altitude above sea level (along with a linear fit). The relationship is 
positive suggesting the appropriateness of altitude as an instrument.   
Slave populations were taken forcedly during the three centuries of colonial regime, 
mainly towards gold mining regions. Since gold mines can be considered randomly distributed 
and were almost completely depleted during the 16
th-18
th centuries, the more natural instrument 
for slavery is the presence of gold mines. A dummy variable was coded following Colmenares 
(1999) (who in turn is based on West, 1952), taking a value of 1 for any actual municipality with 
a gold mine at any time during the colonial period. Figure 9 plots the slave proportion in 1843 
against the dichotomous gold mines variable; the relation is also positive. Table 4 provides 
descriptive statistics of the outcome variables of interest by quartiles of the instruments 
distributions. 
Hence I estimate by two-stages least squares the following model:  
 
 
                                                 
31 Salomon (1991 and 1978) studies the patterns of indian distribution in the Northern Andes –Modern Ecuador and Colombia– which 
he called microverticality. It consists in a settlement pattern of indigenous tribes along the mountain slopes in which settlement 
altitude was chosen optimally as to maximize the number of climatic strata that families in a community could reach, diversifying their 
production and consumption possibilities. This was made possible by the geographic and climatic characteristics of the Northern 
Andes, where climate changes rapidly according to altitude, making it relatively easy to reach different climatic settings at short 
distances.    23
First Stage: 
i i i Altitude Encomienda υ γ γ + + + = i 2X γ 1 0      (2) 
  i i i GoldMines Slavery ν ϕ ϕ ϕ + + + = i 2X 1 0      (3) 
where the dependent variables are defined as above, Altitudei is the altitude above sea level of 
the municipality urban center (in meters), GoldMinesi is the Dummy Variable for presence of 
gold mines during colonial times, and υ i and ν i are error terms assumed to have zero mean.  
 
Second Stage: 
     i i i ate ColonialSt lavery S ncomienda E y ε β β β β + + + + + = i 4X β 3 2 1 0 ˆ ˆ  (4) 
where variables are defined as for equation (1), and  E ˆ ncomiendai and  S ˆ laveryi are the fitted 
predicted values in the first stage regressions (2) and (3). 
   
5. General Results 
  5.1. OLS regressions 
  Tables 5 to 9 present the OLS regressions. In Table 5, regressions for land Gini are 
presented
32. Column 1 shows the linear relationship between Gini and two institutions variables: 
the number of tributary indians and the slave proportion. Both independent variables are very 
significant and positive, meaning that higher intensity of colonial institutions is associated with 
higher inequality. The second column introduces the colonial State presence measure, which 
appears significant and positive, while the signs and significance of the encomienda and slavery 
measures remain unchanged. The following columns check the robustness of the results 
introducing other control variables. Column 3 includes foundation dates and column 4 
geographical controls and the measure of current influence of indigenous culture. In column 5 
foundation date is replaced by the distance to the department capital city. Columns 6 through 8 
use alternative measures of colonial institutions intensity –the number of Crown officials, a 
dummy variable for encomienda and the number of encomiendas in each municipality, 
respectively–.  
The introduction of foundation date (see columns 3, 4, 6-9) –which is always very 
significant and reduces land inequality– makes State presence insignificant. This suggests that 
                                                 
32 The Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure of inequality. In the case of land distribution, it is constructed by calculating the 
proportion of land that each cumulative percentile of the population actually owns, against an equi-distribution –where each 
percentile should own exactly a share equal to its relative size in the whole population–.     24
younger municipalities tend to have a better land distribution, possibly because of frontier 
colonization. Since these municipalities surely had less colonial State presence, this confirms 
the importance of including foundation date in the structural equation; State presence could have 
been capturing the omitted effect of younger municipalities. The introduction of current 
Indigenous influence and geography (see columns 4-9) do not change the results on the colonial 
institutions coefficients either, nor the inclusion of distance to the capital city or the unobservable 
region-specific effects (see column 9)
33. 
The results for the rest of outcome variables are less clear-cut. Tables 6 and 7 present 
the regressions for Primary and Secondary enrollment rates. Tributary indians reduce primary 
enrolment but raise secondary enrolment, while slavery is associated with higher primary and is 
not significant for secondary. On the other hand, State capacity is robustly associated with 
higher enrollment rates. Foundation date (see columns 3, 4, 6-9) is always significant for both 
outcome variables, but while it raises primary enrollment, it reduces secondary enrollment. 
Neither of the control variables changes drastically the results for the coefficients of interest.  
Results for infant mortality rates are shown in Table 8. Tributary indians are associated 
with higher mortality rates while State presence reduces them. Slavery is never significant for 
this outcome variable. The coefficients on foundation date show that younger municipalities, 
ceteris paribus, present better results for infant mortality. The robustness of the tributary indians 
variable only weakens when regional dummies are included (see column 9). Finally, regarding 
the results for the Unmet Basic Needs Index (see Table 9), tributary indians and State capacity 
both reduce poverty significantly, while the coefficient on the proportion of slaves is not 
statistically different from zero. This awkward result for the encomienda intensity measure 
appears together with a positive relation between Foundation date and poverty. As Table 8 
shows, younger municipalities tend to have higher poverty levels.    
  To sum up, encomienda tends to raise inequality and mortality, and reduce primary 
enrollment rates as expected, and strangely, is associated with higher secondary enrollment 
rates and lower poverty levels. Slavery raises land inequality too, but appears to have no 
significant relationship with educational coverage, mortality or poverty. It is interesting to observe 
that State presence is never significant for Gini but usually significant and with the expected sign 
for the rest of the regressions –it reduces poverty and mortality and raises primary and 
secondary enrollment–. Neither distance to the capital city nor current indigenous population 
change the results. The alternative measures of colonial institutions (columns 6, 7 and 8 in the 
                                                 
33 Easten Andean Region is the omitted category.   25
OLS tables) usually produce coefficients with the same signs as the preferred measures, though 
somewhat less significant. The regressions including controls are able to explain around 15% of 
the variability on current outcomes (see R-squares). Although the results for Gini support 
Engerman and Sokoloff’s hypothesis, the results for the other socioeconomic outcomes suggest 
that endogeneity issues and possibly measurement error problems on the explanatory variables 
may be blurring the relationships.        
 
  5.2. IV regressions 
  Tables 10 to 14 present the basic results using Two Stages Least Squares, each one for 
one outcome variable as well. The bottom panels show the first stage relationships between the 
instruments –altitude and gold mines dummy– and tributary indians and slave proportion 
respectively (the potentially endogenous variables). Altitude is always highly significant and with 
the sign suggested by the scatter plot in Figure 8, and the gold mines dummy variable is also 
positively and significantly associated with more slave intensity as Figure 9 shows.  
Results for land Gini regressions are shown in Table 10. Both encomienda intensity and 
slavery maintain their strong association with higher land inequality. The alternative measures of 
encomienda –columns 7 and 8– produce not so significant coefficients: the encomienda dummy 
is significant at the 9% level and the number of encomiendas is not significant at all. This 
suggests that IV solves measurement errors in the number of tributary indians variable, so that 
the predicted number of indians is a clearly superior measure of encomienda intensity. As it 
happened with OLS, the State Presence index is not significant for Gini, but interestingly, the 
alternative measure of State presence, namely crown officials (see column 6), is highly 
significant and has a positive effect on inequality. This result is driven by the outliers in any case. 
As pointed out before, some few colonial cities concentrated the majority of crown officials. 
When regression in column 6 is run excluding outliers, the coefficient on Crown officials looses 
all of its significance while encomienda and slavery remain unchanged (results not reported).  
It is also worth noting that foundation date looses its significance compared to OLS 
results, while distance to the capital city remains highly significant. It appears that after solving 
the endogeneity concerns, younger municipalities do not differentiate significantly in terms of 
their land distribution from older ones. This result is counterintuitive based on Colombian 
historiography on frontier expansion, but is appealing considering that departments with young 
municipalities such as Caldas, Risaralda or Quindío present very high levels of land inequality as 
Table 3 confirms. Current proportion of indians is not significant either, and the introduction of   26
regional dummies (see column 9) produce interesting results too: tributary indians is no longer 
significant for Gini, but slavery remains significant at the 10% level. 
  For primary gross enrollment rates, as Table 11 shows, the negative impact of 
encomienda remains significant, even when using the alternative measures (columns 7 and 8). 
Under OLS slavery produced a striking positive sign (see Table 6), but under IV its coefficient 
looses its significance when geographical variables are added, so its impact cannot be 
statistically distinguished from zero. The Duran y Díaz measures of State presence also loose 
their significance, as well as the variable describing foundation dates.  
The IV regressions produce very interesting results for secondary enrollment (see Table 
12). While OLS coefficients for tributary indians had a strange positive sign, when dealing with 
the endogeneity of this institution the sign becomes robustly negative as expected. The 
significance of tributary indians vanishes when controlling for regional effects, though 
regressions suggest a strong negative impact of encomienda on current educational attainment 
levels. Slavery is never significant for this outcome, and the State presence variable always has 
a very significant and positive effect. This suggests –not forgetting the caveats of the possible 
endogeneity of this institution– some persistence of State presence in Colombia; places with 
more colonial State may be providing more public goods today. Foundation dates remain 
significant and with a negative sign. 
  Results for infant mortality (see Table 13) are qualitatively very similar to those for 
secondary enrolment rates, since encomienda raises mortality and State presence reduces it 
significantly, even after controlling for geography. Controlling for regional dummies makes 
tributary indians no longer significant, suggesting that the pervasive effect of such institution may 
have operated at a regional level more than at a municipality level, or possibly that some omitted 
regional variables are partially correlated with the encomienda measure. Again, slavery and 
current proportion of indians are never significant as it happened in OLS regressions. As in the 
case of land inequality, foundation date looses its significance under IV, so it is no longer 
possible to affirm that younger municipalities achieve better mortality rates. 
  The most striking result appears with the relation between encomienda and poverty, 
measured through the Unmet Basic Needs Index (see Table 14). Its strange negative sign –
meaning less unmet needs– remains unchanged as well as its significance. For slavery, results 
remain insignificant as in OLS except when controlling for regional effects (see column 9), but its 
sign becomes always positive as expected. This is an outstanding result, since it is clear that 
slavery was concentrated in specific regions, so controlling for this fact may be important to 
uncover the effect of this institution. Moreover, State presence reduces poverty significantly. It is   27
worth noting that the alternative measure of State presence is not significant, but again, this 
result is driven by outliers. Foundation date is not significant while distance to the capital city, as 
expected, raises poverty. Finally, the coefficients for current indian population give some support 
for some kind of cultural hypothesis since they are significant and positive, but could also be 
capturing the institutional persistence effect of encomienda if the location of indigenous 
population has not changed considerably for the last centuries. 
  The IV regressions reveal a series of outstanding results suggesting the persistence of 
colonial institutions in Colombia. They are interesting because not all of the institutions 
considered in this paper affect every one of the current socioeconomic performance measures 
chosen. Moreover, finding any evidence of institutional persistence at all is surprising given the 
nature of the data constructed and used. The IV coefficients are always larger in size than the 
OLS coefficients, and some of the signs that appeared as contrary to the hypothesis in OLS 
regressions change in the IV specification, which suggests that measurement error was probably 
biasing the OLS results.  
It is also interesting that encomienda appears to be the particular institution with more 
persistence. Even though its coefficients are usually small in magnitude, the significance and net 
effect is high against every current outcome, and signs –except for poverty– indicate that it has 
had a pervasive effect on local socioeconomic performance. For example, for the case of 
Primary enrollment, based on column 4’s specification, the coefficient is -0.00091. The mean of 
tributary indians is 150.42, so this implies that a 100% increase in the number of tributary indians 
leads to a 150.42x1.0x0.00091=0.137 reduction in the primary enrolment rate. Since the mean 
of primary enrollment is 1.267 and its standard deviation is 0.348, this effect is equivalent to a 
10% reduction in the primary enrollment mean or, equivalently, to 39.3% of the standard 
deviation.  
Slavery persistence appears to be an important determinant of land inequality, raising it 
considerably, and of poverty after controlling for regional effects. This result is particularly 
supportive for institutional persistence since, as noted earlier, slave-economy based regions 
have been identified by historians as the more unequal during colonial times. The quantitative 
effect of slavery on inequality can also be assessed. Based on column 4 in Table 10, the 
coefficient for slavery is 4.864. The mean of the proportion of slaves is 0.081, so this implies that 
a 100% increase in the variable leads to a 0.081x1.0x4.864=0.394 increase in the land Gini 
coefficient. Since the mean of land Gini is 0.684 and its standard deviation is 0.102, this effect is 
equivalent to a 57.6% increase in the variable’s mean or, equivalently, to 3.8 times the standard 
deviation.    28
The opposite occurs with State Presence; it does not affect inequality but raises primary 
and secondary enrollment and reduces mortality and poverty. If in fact the colonial State 
presence has persisted to the present, this may be suggesting that the State has never been 
successful at redistributing land at the municipality level, but has been successful for providing 
local public goods. Finally, results for foundation date are interesting because they do not 
support the common knowledge idea about better socioeconomic performance of younger 
municipalities. Results also suggest a series of caveats that should be investigated in more 
depth elsewhere. The results for slavery on socioeconomic outcomes are not clear, though a 
strong pervasive effect of such an exploitative institution was expected. Results for poverty are 
also unclear, something strange considering that the Unmet Basic Needs index is a structural 
measure of wellbeing.  
  
6. Concluding Remarks 
  This paper aimed to make a contribution in the understanding of economic performance 
differences within Colombia, based on the possibility that institutions have persisted somehow in 
time. Results suggest that colonial institutions, designed depending on a series of local and 
regional characteristics more than four hundred years ago, have determined to some extent 
different paths of economic development in the very long-run. Unfortunately, the results do not 
talk at all about the mechanisms that have caused and permitted persistence, hence the most 
interesting research agenda for the future would be to find evidence that uncovers different 
mechanisms operating. Why didn’t the pervasive effect of exploitative institutions such as 
encomienda and slavery wipe out once Nueva Granada achieved its independence in the early 
19
th century? Even more, how did the State manage to persist at the local level after the Spanish 
regime was overthrown by the criollos? Further research should also take seriously the 
possibility that colonial State presence may be endogenous.  
  Thanks to the fact that very specific institutions were considered in this work to evaluate 
their impact on economic performance, it is possible to highlight some plausible mechanisms of 
institutional persistence that may have been operating in Colombia. In the first place, political 
and economic inequality may be powerful channels favoring the status quo. Historians have 
emphasized how encomenderos were able to concentrate lands around the settlements of 
indians granted to them, and as a consequence, that hacienda was a product of this combination 
of strong local elites and strict control over labor force (Mörner, 1973). On the other hand, 
Slavery was associated with plantation agriculture, where it was used intensively as the way of 
organizing labor. Absenteeism of landowners –widely documented for Colombia during the   29
colonial times as well as during the 19
th century– may have meant a weaker demand for public 
goods in rural areas since landowners usually lived in the cities (Banerjee and Iyer, 2003).  
The social structure of colonial Hispanic America was based on a racial criterion, by 
which non-whites were virtually excluded from the possibility of political participation. The 
excluding character of colonial politics may well have persisted after independence, with criollo 
elites maintaining the monopoly of power and, as a consequence, its privileges. The successful 
capture of the local State may have translated into less provision of public goods such as 
education, health and equality before the law. On the other hand, it may be worth investigating 
the relationship between colonial institutions and violence in Colombia, since political and 
economic exclusion –which are colonial traits– have been stressed as main causes of conflict in 
the country. 
  The general results of this paper suggest that the ways in which the Colombian society 
was organized according to some colonial institutions may constitute a heavy burden on 
economic performance and human welfare up to the present. At the same time, results suggest 
that the State presence at the local level may be a strong force limiting the concentration of 
economic and political power in the hands of elites –encomenderos and slave owners during 
colonial times, regional caciques today–. Institutional persistence may not only be a burden 
because of pervasive institutions in the past, but, if institutions are appropriate, a powerful 
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Casanare 6,430 43.5 33.9 N/A 47.0 N/A 86.2 63.2 58.1
Bogota 2,687 31.1 22.5 43.5 99.8 98.0 84.3 104.3 87.71
San Andres 2,499 24.1 17.9 N/A 72.1 N/A 65.2 83.9 N/A
Santander 2,450 26.4 19.3 49.6 70.4 91.9 78.9 75.5 73.13
Valle 2,171 22.1 16.4 46.4 86.0 95.4 74.8 77.3 79.53
Antioquia 2,162 24.8 18.2 54.9 72.9 94.8 88.9 89.2 75.67
Meta 2,117 45.3 35.4 43.8 65.3 91.6 89.1 75.4 72.05
Cundinamarca 2,108 33.1 24.4 48.5 57.1 93.3 86.6 83.4 69.67
Arauca 2,028 61.2 48.3 N/A 53.8 N/A 81.3 62.8 59.8
La Guajira 1,838 45.6 35.7 50.9 68.6 84.3 89.0 73.7 70.13
Atlantico 1,668 25.7 19.2 55.1 84.7 94.5 71.5 81.2 80.4
Caldas 1,609 27.9 21.0 51.1 64.7 92.7 76.6 74.5 72.16
Tolima 1,609 29.9 22.8 56.0 63.0 88.9 89.3 74.4 68.61
Huila 1,585 37.6 28.7 57.4 61.7 91.8 97.7 76.3 68.71
Boyaca 1,501 38.7 29.2 63.7 44.6 90.1 74.7 71.9 58.81
Bolivar 1,487 49.9 38.4 57.9 49.5 89.5 75.4 58.1 63.32
Guaviare 1,478 48.6 38.1 N/A 25.1 N/A 60.4 33.1 64.1
Cesar 1,452 49.9 39.3 54.6 63.6 85.2 74.4 67.3 69.11
Risaralda 1,385 35.4 26.7 52.3 75.7 94.6 81.9 80.0 77.12
Cordoba 1,347 41.9 32.2 68.9 49.4 83.2 100.8 84.5 58.3
Quindio 1,299 35.0 26.6 49.6 84.7 89.2 79.2 81.3 76.05
Vaupes 1,282 48.6 38.1 N/A 21.0 N/A 72.5 55.5 N/A
Norte de Santander 1,131 30.5 22.9 58.8 74.5 90.1 73.9 68.3 74.16
Cauca 1,049 64.2 50.7 67.7 38.0 90.8 90.4 55.8 61.55
Caqueta 1,031 70.9 56.6 54.8 47.5 91.0 86.2 50.8 68.18
Magdalena 991 39.6 30.5 60.6 51.8 88.1 68.9 52.6 64.88
Amazonas 934 48.6 38.1 N/A 38.7 N/A 57.9 58.5 71.7
Vichada 930 61.2 48.3 N/A 16.2 N/A 62.3 33.3 N/A
Nariño 885 59.8 47.0 70.6 44.6 90.0 81.0 54.9 60.61
Putumayo 831 48.6 38.1 N/A 32.6 N/A 74.1 47.0 68.9
Sucre 774 31.7 23.8 61.1 69.0 84.6 87.4 74.4 62.7
Choco 728 98.8 81.3 75.3 42.1 81.4 99.4 66.9 55.29
Guainia 710 61.2 48.3 N/A 16.5 N/A 57.3 46.3 55.5





births      
 
Source: DANE (2004) and Colombian Health Ministry (2002). 
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Antioquia 125 0.08 0.0070 0.480 0.54
Arauca 7 0 0.0014 0.286 0.00
Atlántico 23 55.87 0.0086 0.739 0.30
Bolivar 44 24.88 0.0108 0.659 89.09
Boyacá 123 359.57 0.0003 0.496 0.67
Caldas 27 74.18 0.0092 0.296 0.41
Caquetá 16 0 0.0000 0.125 0.00
Casanare 19 49.68 0.0003 0.684 0.63
Cauca 41 168.02 0.0357 0.439 7.00
Cesar 25 0 0.0176 0.440 0.96
Chocó 28 1.14 0.0241 0.607 0.79
Córdoba 28 14.75 0.0088 0.571 0.18
Cundinamarca 118 348.33 0.0022 0.593 7.25
Guajira 15 0 0.0096 0.667 1.33
Huila 37 140.46 0.0041 0.730 0.51
Magdalena 30 0 0.0084 0.633 2.17
Meta 29 55.62 0.0000 0.069 0.03
Nariño 64 286.21 0.0122 0.219 0.31
Norte de Santander 40 291.27 0.0041 0.525 0.70
Putumayo 13 307.69 0.0002 0.077 0.00
Quindío 12 35 0.0000 0.000 0.00
Risaralda 14 208.21 0.0057 0.143 0.07
Santander 87 153.18 0.0025 0.655 0.92
Sucre 25 34.96 0.0063 0.520 0.44
Tolima 47 62.89 0.0023 1.170 4.30
Valle 42 72.33 0.0408 0.905 1.62
Colombia 1079 150.42 0.0081 0.540 5.38
Means
 
Source: Duran y Díaz (1794), Tovar (1988) and Secretaría del Interior (1843).   36
Table No. 3 
Measures of the Dependent Variables for Colombian Departments 








Rate (children less 
than 1) (average 00-
02)
Unmet Basic Needs 
Index (1993)
Antioquia N/A 1.26 0.58 28.63 48.46
N/A (0.27) (0.25) (16.25) (18.68)
Arauca 0.58 1.28 0.55 15.81 57.66
(0.14) (0.35) (0.29) (3.60) (10.13)
Atlántico 0.62 1.06 0.73 32.10 47.29
(0.12) (0.17) (0.25) (14.05) (14.09)
Bolivar 0.66 1.33 0.58 48.52 74.82
(0.09) (0.29) (0.19) (42.92) (14.12)
Boyacá 0.66 1.08 0.56 163.97 47.94
(0.10) (0.28) (0.24) (235.98) (14.04)
Caldas 0.75 1.09 0.57 25.80 36.46
(0.08) (0.22) (0.16) (12.34) (11.21)
Caquetá 0.45 1.42 0.39 56.62 63.37
(0.07) (0.31) (0.19) (27.74) (13.61)
Casanare 0.66 1.39 0.61 47.35 57.48
(0.18) (0.47) (0.29) (73.43) (14.52)
Cauca 0.75 1.37 0.48 45.43 66.54
(0.09) (0.30) (0.23) (24.97) (17.46)
Cesar 0.63 1.20 0.50 28.60 63.67
(0.05) (0.28) (0.17) (14.95) (8.55)
Chocó 0.66 1.68 0.55 116.06 80.21
(0.12) (0.41) (0.32) (95.82) (15.46)
Córdoba 0.68 1.79 0.74 35.75 74.22
(0.04) (0.38) (0.19) (14.46) (10.46)
Cundinamarca 0.69 1.26 0.73 193.03 40.82
(0.09) (0.32) (0.29) (262.08) (12.95)
Guajira 0.61 1.68 0.88 47.99 63.74
(0.08) (0.52) (0.38) (45.17) (18.64)
Huila 0.71 1.40 0.57 30.79 48.80
(0.06) (0.19) (0.23) (31.03) (8.75)
Magdalena 0.65 1.36 0.58 46.06 69.93
(0.10) (0.36) (0.19) (39.62) (10.64)
Meta 0.65 1.42 0.51 34.89 54.48
(0.12) (0.37) (0.29) (35.28) (20.68)
Nariño 0.70 1.13 0.40 45.06 66.56
(0.08) (0.49) (0.26) (69.07) (17.09)
Norte de Santander 0.66 1.15 0.43 55.88 55.27
(0.11) (0.22) (0.19) (57.74) (15.32)
Putumayo 0.74 1.55 0.57 28.51 78.55
(0.06) (0.47) (0.31) (15.87) (17.48)
Quindío 0.73 1.13 0.66 28.64 29.75
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (7.42) (5.00)
Risaralda 0.70 1.21 0.54 27.67 35.79
(0.07) (0.20) (0.17) (21.61) (11.38)
Santander 0.68 1.13 0.47 49.30 48.40
(0.08) (0.25) (0.23) (115.14) (14.32)
Sucre 0.73 1.46 0.65 53.39 73.48
(0.07) (0.32) (0.18) (105.67) (11.94)
Tolima 0.72 1.40 0.67 25.64 46.70
(0.07) (0.31) (0.24) (9.26) (13.52)
Valle 0.79 1.25 0.69 29.75 31.53
(0.07) (0.22) (0.20) (14.40) (5.41)
Colombia 0.68 1.27 0.58 69.03 53.43
(0.10) (0.35) (0.26) (136.15) (19.12)
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables
 
Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Caballero, Hillón and Offstein (2003), DNP (2004) and DANE (2004). 
 
Table No. 4 


















Land Gini (2002) 0.66 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.69 0.68 0.66
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
Primary Gross Enrolment 
Rate (average 92-02)
1.41 1.30 1.20 1.15 1.28 1.25 1.24 1.29
(0.40) (0.30) (0.29) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.36) (0.37)
Secondary Gross Enrolment 
Rate (average 92-02)
0.61 0.58 0.54 0.57 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.62
(0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.29) (0.24) (0.25) (0.28) (0.26)
Infant Mortality Rate 
(children less than 1) (average 
00-02)
51.11 50.94 71.93 108.81 38.51 64.51 95.28 78.65
(79.48) (111.06) (137.80) (194.86) (36.74) (148.56) (175.91) (136.03)
Unmet Basic Needs Index 
(1993)
66.02 51.00 47.51 49.22 52.83 50.70 51.87 58.30
(16.50) (17.62) (17.60) (18.88) (19.48) (19.40) (19.13) (17.63)
By Quartiles of Altitude above Sea Level By Quartiles of Distance to Gold Mines
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables
 
Source: Caballero, Hillón and Offstein (2003), Bernanrd and Zambrano (1993), Colmenares (1999), 
DNP (2004) and DANE (2004).   37
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 
Table No. 5 
Land Gini  
Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population 0.000046 0.000045 0.000029 0.000024 0.000033 0.000024 0.000024
(0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000009) (0.000008) (0.000008)
Encomienda Dummy 0.023289
(0.006989)
Number of Encomiendas 0.00350
0.00158
Proportion of Slaves 0.775 0.720 0.638 0.539 0.658 0.531 0.538 0.528 0.465834
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.111936)
Duran y Díaz Index 0.0070 -0.0035 -0.0007 0.0069 -0.0011  -0.0019  -0.004662 
(0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0040)
Number of Crown Officials 0.000049
(0.000004)
Foundation Date -0.00013 -0.00011  -0.00011 -0.00011  -0.00013  -0.000123 
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Distance to Department Capital -0.00019 
(0.00004)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. 0.00020 0.00042 0.00022 0.00017 0.00023 -0.000058 
(0.00044) (0.00042) (0.00044) (0.00045) (0.00045) (0.00045)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.19
No. of Observations 927 927 887 883 899 883 883 883 883
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported




Table No. 6 
Primary Gross Enrolment Rate 
Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population -0.000108 -0.000110 -0.000083 -0.000062 -0.000079 -0.000060  -0.000053 
(0.000025) (0.000026) (0.000023) (0.000019) (0.000021) (0.000021) (0.000019)
Encomienda Dummy -0.028970 
(0.022430)
Number of Encomiendas 0.000093
(0.004425)
Proportion of Slaves 1.429 1.378 1.582 0.782 0.623 0.972 0.833 0.849 1.163318
(0.36) (0.37) (0.38) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.457901)
Duran y Díaz Index 0.0059 0.0286 0.0347 0.0157 0.0342 0.0345 0.032994
(0.0113) (0.0133) (0.0129) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.012975)
Number of Crown Officials -0.000048 
(0.000020)
Foundation Date 0.00033 0.00028 0.00018 0.00030 0.00033 0.000228
(0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.000112)
Distance to Department Capital 0.00015
(0.00013)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. 0.00592 0.00584 0.00563 0.00582 0.00575 0.006156
(0.00147) (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00147) (0.001611)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.14
No. of Observations 1,030 1,030 1,014 1,013 1,029 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported
Dependent Variable: Gross Primary Enrollment Rate
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Table No. 7 
Secondary Gross Enrolment Rate 
Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population 0.000056 0.000042 0.000026 0.000038 0.000037 0.000037 0.000046
(0.000019) (0.000021) (0.000021) (0.000024) (0.000023) (0.000024) (0.000023)
Encomienda Dummy 0.047762
(0.018939)
Number of Encomiendas 0.010433
(0.004320)
Proportion of Slaves 0.659 0.189 0.070 0.242 0.354 0.431 0.225 0.225 0.503476
(0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.353862)
Duran y Díaz Index 0.0538 0.0395 0.0361 0.0410 0.0368 0.0346 0.033467
(0.0088) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0084) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.010519)
Number of Crown Officials 0.000044
(0.000016)
Foundation Date -0.00020 -0.00013  -0.00023 -0.00011 -0.00013  -0.000155 
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.000080)
Distance to Department Capital -0.00071 
(0.00008)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. -0.00142 -0.00119 -0.00170 -0.00144 -0.00128  -0.000996 
(0.00096) (0.00099) (0.00097) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.001013)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09
No. of Observations 1,032 1,032 1,016 1,015 1,031 1,015 1,015 1,015 1,015
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported
Dependent Variable: Gross Secondary Enrollment Rate
 
 
Table No. 8 
Infant Mortality Rate 
Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population 0.023653 0.028885 0.017280 0.005995 0.015722 0.005714 -0.009051 
(0.016632) (0.016281) (0.016319) (0.016515) (0.016066) (0.017653) (0.017092)
Encomienda Dummy 15.378000
(10.8523)
Number of Encomiendas 0.069961
(2.175508)
Proportion of Slaves -205.690 -49.362 -138.751 160.410 267.381 3.382 162.327 153.582 163.341
(136.86) (140.56) (148.51) (156.77) (154.62) (152.16) (154.67) (154.05) (148.560)
Duran y Díaz Index -17.9937 -28.9550 -29.7454 -20.3359  -29.5611 -29.7225  -24.6427 
(4.3050) (5.3232) (5.4319) (4.6817) (5.4199) (5.3460) (5.1979)
Number of Crown Officials -0.013523 
(0.011922)
Foundation Date -0.15388 -0.14087  -0.04953 -0.13025 -0.14550 -0.087669 
(0.03712) (0.03691) (0.03241) (0.03553) (0.0348) (0.0339)
Distance to Department Capital 0.00316
(0.03430)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. -0.08156 0.09550 0.17063 -0.10342 -0.06430 0.216046
(0.25089) (0.24998) (0.24434) (0.24736) (0.24700) (0.214277)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.14
No. of Observations 1,000 1,000 983 982 999 982 982 982 982
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported
Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Children less than 1)
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Table No. 9 
Unmet Basic Needs Index 
Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population -0.008903 -0.007775 -0.006032 -0.003336 -0.003292 -0.003162  -0.004144 
(0.001427) (0.001430) (0.001254) (0.001115) (0.001030) (0.001156) (0.001237)
Encomienda Dummy -3.765764 
(1.193064)
Number of Encomiendas -0.565066 
(0.256057)
Proportion of Slaves 2.880 38.776 48.802 -1.933 -13.923  -12.417 -0.319  0.470 -26.4661 
(27.60) (26.82) (26.32) (24.48) (23.45) (24.98) (23.88) (24.00) (23.71)
Duran y Díaz Index -4.0015 -2.5318 -2.0708 -2.6562  -2.1211 -1.9915 -1.62073 
(0.6391) (0.7424) (0.6644) (0.5381) (0.6612) (0.6703) (0.62)
Number of Crown Officials -0.007244 
(0.001199)
Foundation Date 0.01588 0.01301 0.01883 0.01196 0.01432 0.01163
(0.00531) (0.00475) (0.00424) (0.00476) (0.00470) (0.00462)
Distance to Department Capital 0.06631
(0.00522)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. 0.67899 0.65963 0.69325 0.67951 0.66814 0.57946
(0.05374) (0.05206) (0.05293) (0.05482) (0.05603) (0.05454)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.24 0.33 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.37
No. of Observations 1,079 1,079 1,033 1,027 1,044 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported
Dependent Variable: Unmet Basic Needs Index
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Instrumental Variables Regressions 
Table No. 10 
Land Gini 
Instrumental Variables
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population 0.000163 0.000158 0.000161 0.000141 0.000114 0.000161 0.0000631
(0.000038) (0.000036) (0.000046) (0.000076) (0.000047) (0.000078) (0.000071)
Encomienda Dummy 0.1226
(0.072)
Number of Encomiendas 0.0826
(0.0583)
Proportion of Slaves 2.855 3.128 3.048 4.864 4.874 4.176 5.661 2.885 2.773979
(0.952) (1.158) (1.116) (2.942) (2.645) (2.171) (3.642) (2.382) (1.6531)
Duran y Díaz Index -0.0154 -0.0117 -0.0203 -0.0286  -0.0271  -0.0269  -0.015539
(0.0107) (0.0082) (0.0168) (0.0225) (0.0211) (0.0184) (0.0095)
Number of Crown Officials 0.000038
(0.000008)
Foundation Date 0.000055 0.00012 0.00017 0.00015 0.00015 -2.12E-05
(0.000070) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Distance to Department Capital -0.00017 
(0.0001)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. 0.00060 0.00044 0.00066 0.00056 0.00086 0.0005672
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
Panel B: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Altitude Above Sea Level 0.156070 0.163545 0.143898 0.119596 0.139384 0.120371 0.000155 0.000141 0.122101
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0186)
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.23
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dummy for Gold Mines 0.019308 0.017174 0.017330 0.008036 0.009130 0.009392 0.008036 0.008036 0.007552
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031)
R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.25
No. of Observations 889 889 873 872 888 872 872 872 872
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported
Dependent Variable: Tributary Indian Population in 1560
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Slaves in 1843
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Table No. 11 
Primary Gross Enrolment Rate 
Instrumental Variables
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population -0.000641 -0.000640 -0.000654 -0.000909 -0.000850 -0.000903  -0.0004966
(0.000127) (0.000125) (0.000156) (0.000242) (0.000183) (0.000246) (0.000213)
Encomienda Dummy -0.8749 
(0.227)
Number of Encomiendas -0.3699 
(0.2163)
Proportion of Slaves 4.748 4.557 4.533 6.434 6.724 6.544 6.781 27.915 7.305211
(2.355) (2.844) (2.970) (5.096) (4.663) (4.241) (5.062) (11.874) (4.8447)
Duran y Díaz Index 0.0093 0.0017 0.0008 0.0072 -0.0104 -0.0593 0.0043234
(0.0328) (0.0306) (0.0454) (0.0492) (0.0341) (0.0890) (0.0331)
Number of Crown Officials 0.000154
(0.000303)
Foundation Date -0.000111 -0.00018  -0.00016 -0.00032 0.00035 0.0001375
(0.000216) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Distance to Department Capital -0.00006 
(0.0002)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. 0.00890 0.00913 0.00892 0.00857 0.00706 0.009271
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0022)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
Panel B: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Altitude Above Sea Level 0.146468 0.153172 0.135228 0.096163 0.110492 0.093964 0.000099 0.000067 0.1147
(0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0189)
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.19
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dummy for Gold Mines 0.032086 0.028070 0.027224 0.018568 0.021177 0.020585 0.018568 0.018568 0.016081
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0039)
R-squared 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.26
No. of Observations 1,030 1,030 1,014 1,013 1,029 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported
Dependent Variable: Tributary Indian Population in 1560
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Slaves in 1843
Dependent Variable: Gross Primary Enrollment Rate
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Table No. 12 
Secondary Gross Enrolment Rate 
Instrumental Variables
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population -0.000137 -0.000128 -0.000243 -0.000232 -0.000181 -0.000267  -0.0001663
(0.000072) (0.000070) (0.000089) (0.000125) (0.000099) (0.000130) (0.000120)
Encomienda Dummy -0.2228 
(0.119)
Number of Encomiendas -0.0950 
(0.0654)
Proportion of Slaves -0.410 -2.052 -2.390 -0.227 1.785 0.874 -0.137  5.289 -0.0785901
(1.164) (1.470) (1.584) (2.073) (1.935) (1.833) (2.172) (3.968) (2.2022)
Duran y Díaz Index 0.0796 0.0497 0.0378 0.0409 0.0350 0.0222 0.0377472
(0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0177) (0.0196) (0.0164) (0.0252) (0.0168)
Number of Crown Officials 0.000122
(0.000114)
Foundation Date -0.000485 -0.00035  -0.00044 -0.00039 -0.00022 -0.0003132
(0.000129) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Distance to Department Capital -0.00077 
(0.0001)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. -0.00068 -0.00027 -0.00073 -0.00076  -0.00115  -0.0004849
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
Panel B: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Altitude Above Sea Level 0.146410 0.152975 0.135234 0.096104 0.110274 0.093903 0.000099 0.000067 0.1144
(0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0188)
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.19
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dummy for Gold Mines 0.032119 0.028083 0.027247 0.018607 0.021196 0.020659 0.018607 0.018607 0.016135
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0039)
R-squared 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.26
No. of Observations 1,032 1,032 1,016 1,015 1,031 1,015 1,015 1,015 1,015
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported
Dependent Variable: Tributary Indian Population in 1560
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Slaves in 1843
Dependent Variable: Gross Secondary Enrollment Rate
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Table No. 13 
Infant Mortality Rate 
Instrumental Variables
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population 0.151737 0.150124 0.138670 0.145395 0.158017 0.171841 0.0362262
(0.04116) (0.03968) (0.04476) (0.06308) (0.05271) (0.06817) (0.05904)
Encomienda Dummy 136.0856
(55.728)
Number of Encomiendas 57.6571
(36.1096)
Proportion of Slaves -857.584 -391.508 -422.745  42.090 0.127 -799.395 -33.125  -3,239.110  461.159
(484.129) (518.239) (523.957) (828.175) (787.556) (778.100) (763.030) (2179.462) 718.292
Duran y Díaz Index -22.1288 -25.8352 -28.9921 -26.0060 -26.9088  -20.0004  -26.576
(8.1892) (7.6809) (9.0744) (10.3005) (7.1193) (14.9960) 6.813
Number of Crown Officials -0.054257 
(0.067514)
Foundation Date -0.055632 -0.03882  0.03065 -0.01824  -0.12548  -0.0484187
(0.051922) (0.0697) (0.0801) (0.0742) (0.0968) (0.0567)
Distance to Department Capital 0.03962
(0.0361)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. -0.50191 -0.48858 -0.43718  -0.43159  -0.18493  0.1534728
(0.4878) (0.5217) (0.5580) (0.3548) (0.4964) (0.3811)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
Panel B: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Altitude Above Sea Level 0.144709 0.151185 0.134696 0.095751 0.109642 0.093165 0.000101 0.000069 0.1151
(0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0163) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0194)
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.12 0.19
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dummy for Gold Mines 0.034064 0.029709 0.028919 0.020016 0.022587 0.022338 0.020016 0.020016 0.017916
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0040)
R-squared 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.27
No. of Observations 1,000 1,000 983 982 999 982 982 982 982
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported
Dependent Variable: Tributary Indian Population in 1560
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Slaves in 1843
Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Children less than 1)
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Table No. 14 
Unmet Basic Needs Index 
Instrumental Variables
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tributary Indian Population -0.047834 -0.048137 -0.050012 -0.056013 -0.049753 -0.050759  -0.0202402
(0.007557) (0.007766) (0.010117) (0.014519) (0.009550) (0.013448) (0.011708)
Encomienda Dummy -52.9104 
(12.686)
Number of Encomiendas -22.5103 
(12.8201)
Proportion of Slaves 264.772 351.521 343.839 427.976 313.139 302.122 451.032 1,698.724 482.193
(150.952) (197.531) (207.621) (324.256) (254.196) (235.532) (309.884) (715.051) 281.877
Duran y Díaz Index -3.9813 -4.9417 -4.5910 -2.8782  -5.2765  -8.1447  -4.142
(2.2945) (2.2135) (2.8580) (2.7620) (2.1161) (5.5507) 1.799
Number of Crown Officials 0.004170
(0.015582)
Foundation Date -0.015842 -0.01242  0.00036 -0.02034 0.02097 0.017726
(0.013385) (0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0203) (0.0368) (0.0161)
Distance to Department Capital 0.05309
(0.0078)
Current Proportion of Indian Pop. 0.86967 0.85235 0.87649 0.85070 0.76590 0.7706084
(0.1409) (0.1254) (0.1260) (0.0976) (0.1779) (0.0878)
Geography No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Dummies No No No No No No No No Yes
Panel B: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Altitude Above Sea Level 0.144170 0.150472 0.132249 0.095411 0.110014 0.092865 0.000100 0.000074 0.1121
(0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0187)
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.12 0.18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dummy for Gold Mines 0.032380 0.028072 0.027224 0.018914 0.021429 0.021113 0.018914 0.018914 0.016748
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038)
R-squared 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.26
No. of Observations 1,047 1,047 1,030 1,027 1,044 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Constant not reported
Dependent Variable: Tributary Indian Population in 1560
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Slaves in 1843
Dependent Variable: Unmet Basic Needs
   45
Figures.  
The Cartography of Colonial Institutions 
F i g u r e   N o .   1            F i g u r e   N o .   2  





























Source:  Tovar,  Hermes  (1988)           Source:  Secretaría  del  Interior  (1843).     46
F i g u r e   N o .   3             F i g u r e   N o .   4  
Number of Crown Employees in 1794   Index of Colonial State Presence for 1794 (Estancos, Alcabalas 



































Source: Duran y Díaz (1794)             Source: Duran y Díaz (1794)    47
Colonial Institutions and Economic Development 
Figure No. 5 

























Source: DANE (2004) and Secretaría del Interior (1843). 
 
Figure No. 6 




















Source: DANE (2004) and Tovar (1988). 
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Figure No. 7 




















Source: DANE (2004) and Duran y Díaz (1794). 
 
Figure No. 8 






















Source: Bernard and Zambrano (1993) and Tovar (1988) 
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Figure No. 9 
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Appendix 1: Data Description and Sources 
 
 
Presence of the State Variables 
The proxies for presence of the Colonial State were constructed based on the Guía de Forasteros del Nuevo Reino de 
Granada by Joaquín Duran y Díaz (1794). Duran y Díaz constructed a full account of the Colonial State bureaucracy 
and fiscal accounts for 1794, coding all the crown employees in each city, villa or town and their salaries, along with 
information about the presence of estancos (State monopolies over tobacco, playing cards, aguardiente and 
gunpowder), alcabalas (consumption taxes), mail services and mail administrations among much more data. This 
book provided data for more than 600 colonial locations, which were successfully matched to 513 current 
municipalities. The matching between Duran y Diaz locations and current municipalities required a careful comparison 
of the names of all the different geographical locations even within a municipality, since from 1794 onwards many new 
municipalities have been created. Though new municipalities may have been created later than 1794, probably small 
towns or villages which were to become future municipalities did exist in 1794, and were registered as such by Duran 
y Diaz. This allowed us to find State presence data even for non existent municipalities in 1794. 
We created several municipality-level variables: 
  Number of crown employees. 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality had a tobacco or playing cards estanco. 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality had an aguardiente or gunpowder estanco. 
Discrete variable equal to 1 if the municipality had of the latter, 2 if it had both, and 0 if it had none. 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality had an alcabala. 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality had mail service. 
Index taking values from 1 to 4 aggregating the presence of Tobacco or playing cards estanco, aguardiente 




The population data on tributary indians must be based on the Visitas de la Tierra, censuses built up by crown officials 
specifically in charge of counting the tributary populations in the different provinces. This Visitas had the purpose of 
establishing the tribute indigenous communities should pay, for which the number of tributaries was necessary. The 
State officials travelled all along the region where they were supposed to do the censuses. Many of these were built 
during all the three centuries of colonial control, though some have more systematic and thorough information than 
others. For the purpose of this research, it was important to have a source that could provide a comprehensive 
coverage of the kingdom, and that could offer comparable data. This was the reason for choosing the 1560 
anonymous visit transcribed by Hermes Tovar (1988) in No hay Caciques ni Señores, which has useful data on 
tributary indians for the actual departments of Bolivar, Sucre, Cordoba, Cauca, Cundinamarca, Boyacá, Tolima, Huila, 
Nariño, Caldas, Risaralda, Valle, Santander and Norte de Santander, and even for some municipalities of Casanare, 
Arauca and Putumayo. The visit of Rodrigo Zapata in 1658 also has comprehensive data on tributary indians for the 
same regions.  
The Visits present the data assigning a number of tributary indians to an encomienda. The name of each encomienda 
was usually related to the name of the tribe or to the name of the tribe’s cacique. To find the specific location of each 
encomienda, it was necessary to look for all the geographical and historical information about place names, as well as 
toponimics, with the help of anthropological investigations. Los Nombres Originales, a book on toponimics for all 
Colombia done by the IGAC which includes maps, was especially helpful. 
We were also able to assign different number of encomiendas to each municipality, since several observations in the 
visits could be matched to the same current municipality. As a result, we have three measures of encomienda at the 
municipality-level:  
  The number of tributary indians 
  The number of encomiendas 




African slaves brought to America were introduced to the actual Colombia since the late 16
th century, and taken 
mainly to the Caribbean Coast where they served in plantations, or to the Pacific lowlands where gold alluvial deposits 
were found. It is only until 1778 that a systematic census which includes slave population can be found for the Nueva 
Granada. Though the 1778 census was based on a village to village population count, information at some more 
aggregate level remains available only. The 1843 census published by the Secretaría del Interior in the Estadística 
General de la Nueva Granada (by this time the Nueva Granada had achieved its independence though slavery had   51
not been abolished) has more disaggregated data (for 628 current municipalities). By this time slave population had 
declined considerably, but the slave proportions are very similar between the 1778 and the 1843 censuses between 
regions. Because of the more disaggregated data with a very similar pattern, we decided to use the 1843 census as 
the main source for measuring slavery. The measure of this institution at the municipality level is: 




Land Gini coefficients were taken from Caballero, Hillón and Offstein (2003), who built them based on the Catastros of 
the Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (IGAC) for the year 2002. The IGAC Catastros do not present data for 
Antioquia. 
Primary and Secondary Gross Enrolment Rates were taken from the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico 
(CEDE-Universidad de los Andes) database, as the average for the period 1992-2002. They are calculated as the 
total number of enrolled children in each educational level divided by the estimated number of children in the age 
range specific to each school level. 
Infant Mortality Rates were also taken from the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE-Universidad 
de los Andes) database, as the average for the period 2000-2002. It is calculated as the ration between the number of 
deaths of children less than 1 year old and the number of births over the last year. 
The Unmet Basic Needs Index was calculated with information provided by the Departamento Nacional de Esatdística 
(DANE) based on the 1993 Population Census. This index measures the proportion of the population under one or 
more of the following criteria: Inadequate house materials, high economic dependency, school un-assistance of any 




Geographical variables were taken from the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE-Universidad de 
los Andes) database: 
Altitude is measured as the altitude above sea level, in meters, of the urban center of each municipality. 
Rainfall is measured as the mean annual rainfall in each municipality. 
Latitude 
Longitude 
  Density of primary, secondary and tertiary rivers were built as the quotient between the longitude of each 
kind of river in meters and the surface area of each municipality in square kilometers. The classification of 
rivers was taken from IGAC.   
Foundation Dates were taken from the original database constructed by Bernand and Zambrano (1993). 
Current Indigenous population was taken from Roldán, Sánchez and Sánchez (1990), which present data for the 1985 
census. 
Distance to Department Capital was built directly by María Angélica Bautista, as the linear distance in kilometers from 
the urban center of each municipality to the center of the Capital city of its department. 
The Gold Mines dummy variable was built by the author based on Colmenares (1999). 
Regions dummies were built for five different regions; Caribbean Coast, Pacific Coast, Central Andean, Eastern 
Andean and East. 
Carribean Coast dummy takes the value of 1 if the municipality is in any of the following departments: 
Guajira, Cesar, Atlántico, Magdalena, Bolivar, Sucre or Córdoba. 
Pacific Coast dummy takes the value of 1 if the municipality is in any of the following departments: Chocó, 
Valle del Cauca, Cauca or Nariño. 
Central Andean dummy takes the value of 1 if the municipality is in any of the following departments: 
Antioquia, Caldas, Risaralda, Quindío, Tolima or Huila. 
Eastern Andean dummy takes the value of 1 if the municipality is in any of the following departments: Norte 
de Santander, Santander, Boyacá or Cundinamarca. 
Eastern dummy takes the value of 1 if the municipality is in any of the following departments: Arauca, 
Casanare, Meta, Caquetá or Putumayo. 